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Abstract
Managed care organizations (MCOs), as insurance entities, should be liable under contract for inappropriate
denial of coverage, whereas treatment errors should be conventional malpractice claims against physicians.
Most MCOs are loose networks of independent practices that lack the requisite information or technology to
improve care. Holding such MCOs vicariously liable for their physicians’ negligence would lead to increased
“false positive” claims and distort deterrence. Integrated MCOs already contractually assume responsibility for
the negligence of their salaried physicians, which appears to be efficient. Maintaining the distinction between
medical error and coverage denial requires that treatment decisions be evaluated relative to a standard of care
that recognizes common MCO control strategies. Class actions against MCOs are based on the false premise
that MCO cost control strategies harm patients. Charges that enrollees were led to expect more coverage than
they actually received imply, if true, that HMOs should have realized supernormal profits, for which there is
no evidence.
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COMMENTS ON "THE ASSAULT ON MANAGED
CARE: VICARIOUS LIABILITY, ERISA
PREEMPTION, AND CLASS ACTIONS"
PATRICIA DANZON and FRANK SLOAN*
ABSTRACT
Managed care organizations (MCOs), as insurance entities, should be liable under
contract for inappropriate denial of coverage, whereas treatment errors should be
conventional malpractice claims against physicians. Most MCOs are loose networks
of independent practices that lack the requisite information or technology to improve
care. Holding such MCOs vicariously liable for their physicians' negligence would
lead to increased "false positive" claims and distort deterrence. Integrated MCOs
already contractually assume responsibility for the negligence of their salaried phy-
sicians, which appears to be efficient. Maintaining the distinction between medical
error and coverage denial requires that treatment decisions be evaluated relative to
a standard of care that recognizes common MCO control strategies. Class actions
against MCOs are based on the false premise that MCO cost control strategies harm
patients. Charges that enrollees were led to expect more coverage than they actually
received imply, if true, that HMOs should have realized supernormal profits, for
which there is no evidence.
RCHARD EPSTEIN and Alan Sykes provide a very useful summary of the
current state of the law and legal issues related to managed care organization
(MCO) liability in tort and contract, the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act (ERISA) preemption, recent class action suits, and patients' bill
of rights legislation.' After describing these developments, most of the paper
is devoted to a careful analysis of recent and proposed legislative changes
and judicial interpretations. They focus on (1) imposing vicarious liability
on MCOs for the malpractice of affiliated physicians, (2) introducing a new
remedy for wrongful denial of coverage in addition to or in lieu of the existing
civil enforcement action under ERISA, and (3) restrictions on contracting
between MCOs and their physicians or subscribers, including prohibitions
* Danzon is Celia Z. Moh Professor and Professor of Health Care Systems and Insurance
and Risk Management, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Sloan is J. Alexander
McMahon Professor of Health Policy and Management, Professor of Economics, and Director
of the Center for Health Policy, Law and Management, Duke University.
'Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability,
ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, in this issue, at 625.
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of indemnification and retaliation or waiver of statutory duties. They conclude
with a detailed analysis of class action suits, both costs and benefits of such
litigation in general and as applied to MCOs.
With some relatively minor quibbles, detailed below, we concur with the
authors' basic conclusions. Some of our comments are already reflected in
the published version of their paper. Our comments here focus on the positive
analysis of implementing these proposals in practice and on the likely effects
of alternative legal rules on health care systems.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
On the issue of vicarious liability, Epstein and Sykes conclude that MCOs
should be liable under contract for denial of coverage but, in general, MCOs
should not be subject to vicarious liability for negligent care by contracted
providers. As managed care organizations, MCOs ideally would possess ex-
cellent information systems for tracking practice patterns of individual phy-
sicians and medical errors, and practice patterns would be guided by evidence
from randomized controlled trials. Their decision-making systems would be
sufficiently sensitive to patient heterogeneity in clinical condition and in
preferences.
In practice, however, managed care to date has amounted to much less
than this. If imposing vicarious liability on such organizations would en-
courage MCOs to implement such systems, it might be worthwhile, but
invention precedes innovation, and many of the requisite inventions to really
improve efficient provision of care in multipractice or network settings do
not exist.
An MCO is a risk-bearing insurance entity that designs coverage, sets
premiums, and negotiates with providers, who agree to accept discounted
fees or capitation in return for being in the preferred network. The predom-
inant, network-type MCO lacks the information and the authority that would
be necessary to monitor and guide providers' care patterns on a day-to-
day basis. Most MCOs-independent practice association (IPA) and point-
of-service (POS) model HMOs and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs)-are set up as networks of providers who practice individually or in
groups across a broad geographic area that spans the MCO's coverage area.
Even with the growth of MCOs, most individual physicians still practice on
a fee-for-service, albeit discounted fee-for-service, basis. The typical phy-
sician or physician group contracts with several networks, making it highly
impractical for a single MCO to dictate an individual's practice style. Market
shares of truly vertically integrated MCOs-those that employ exclusive,
salaried physicians who practice in designated clinics-have been declining
as the less vertically integrated variants have expanded, perhaps in part be-
cause such integration has not delivered on its promises and/or consumers
want complete choice of provider.
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In fact, the integrated variants have already contractually assumed re-
sponsibility for the negligence of their salaried physicians, which seems
appropriate. By contrast, in the case of network models, concern to create
incentives for deterrence while minimizing transactions costs argues for gen-
erally placing liability for negligence on physicians, who are best placed to
make appropriate care decisions. Placing vicarious liability on the MCO
might lead MCOs to try to assert more control over physicians without having
the requisite information or technology for truly improving care. Thus, given
the imperfect "real" world in which medicine is practiced, the market appears
to be already providing for efficient assignment of liability, depending on
other elements of the contractual relation between physicians and the insti-
tutions that they relate to-either HMOs or hospitals (for example, peer
review). There is no obvious efficiency reason for courts or legislatures to
interfere with this contractual assignment, by forcing vicarious liability on
MCOs of all stripes. This might be done for political reasons, however, as
public sentiment for "MCO bashing" aligns with provider self-interest.
Another potential shortcoming for making MCOs vicariously liable is that
this might lead to blame shifting. If MCOs can be named as codefendants,
with joint and several liability, the physician defendant's optimal strategy
might be to support the plaintiffs case, implicitly or explicitly, arguing that
the patient could or should have had better care but that this was precluded
by the various constraints imposed by the MCO. Physicians would often be
in a position to shift liability to the MCO because, at the end of the day,
physicians are viewed as the experts when it comes to defining appropriate
care. Another view, one that we share, is that physicians bear some respon-
sibility in contracting with "rogue" organizations. If the organization is not
one with which he or she feels comfortable, a physician is under no obligation
to contract with it. This consideration is particularly relevant in major met-
ropolitan areas where there are many MCOs among which physicians and
patients can chose. The first-line safeguard of quality is physicians' and
patients' free ability to select among competitor health plans.
Organized medicine has been on both sides of the fence on the vicarious
liability issue. On the one hand, there is the deep-pocket issue. People may
not want to sue their physicians, with whom they have a personal relationship.
However, suing a "big HMO" is another matter. Thus, frequency of suits
may rise. On the other hand, it seems to view anything bad for MCOs as a
good thing.
This turns out to be a complicated issue. Even in the case of multiple
physician or hospital defendants, adding additional defendants tends to in-
crease the size of the award, plausibly because these multiple defendants
serve the patient's case in trying to shift liability between themselves.2 This
2 Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983). Randall R. Bovbjerg etal., Juries and Justice:
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effect would surely extend to an increased probability of winning in cases
where the codefendant is an MCO, because the physician could point to
reimbursement rules and protocols as limiting what could be done. This is
surely an easier argument to develop and a more persuasive one to juries
than trying to find some clinical error of judgment of a codefendant, as in
the standard multiple-defendant case. Whether securing a new deep pocket
is socially optimal or not depends in part on whether or not there is under-
or overclaiming prior to the change and on whether the resulting decisions
reflect an appropriate standard of care and coverage. If anything, as discussed
further below, there is evidence of underclaiming (false negatives) rather than
overclaiming (false positives) for injuries caused by physician negligence.3
However, it is far from certain that adding the potential to sue HMOs will,
on balance, reduce the false negatives more than it increases the false pos-
itives. And if medical error claims are generally converted into coverage
claims, it is far from certain that the resulting norms will be sound.
LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL DENIAL OF COVERAGE
As discussed by Epstein and Sykes, because of the ERISA preemption,
which applies to the vast majority of privately insured individuals, MCO
enrollees are largely limited to a civil enforcement action under ERISA when
they seek redress of denial of benefits by the MCOs. This means that plaintiffs
are not entitled to recovery for their economic and noneconomic losses as
under tort. Rather, such disputes are limited to reinstatement of the denied
benefit.
Although lack of ability to recover damages would seem to encourage
plans to deny benefits, Epstein and Sykes make some good points that,
because of other constraints, the plans are unlikely to do this. For example,
disgruntled employees, facing denials, will complain about this to their em-
ployers, encouraging the firm to drop the plan from its options. Or the
employee can exercise his or her option to exit at the next open-enrollment
period. The bedrock safeguard of patients' rights in the end is the market,
not the legal system. Also, employee groups should have the option of con-
tracting away certain benefits with the proviso that they reap the savings in
some form, such as higher wages and/or more fringe benefits.
With recoveries being potentially much larger for conventional tort claims
for medical errors than for denial of coverage, it seems likely that plaintiffs
will want to convert the latter case types into the former. The distinction
between errors in treatment, which should be handled as conventional claims
of malpractice against physicians, and denial of coverage, which should be
Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal? 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5
(1991).
' See note 12 infra.
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contract cases against MCOs, is fundamental to the arguments in Epstein
and Sykes's paper and this comment.4
However, whether this distinction can be made in practice is a key issue,
in order to respond to those who argue that in fact physicians' treatment
decisions are so influenced by the financial and other constraints imposed
by MCOs that MCOs must be viewed as participants in the treatment
decision. If most allegations of improper treatment can be reasonably trans-
posed into claims of improper denial of coverage-that a physician would
have treated the patient differently were it not for the MCO's con-
straints-then the case against vicarious liability is weak, conceptually and
in practice.
This conceptual distinction between medical error and coverage denial
should be clear in egregious cases of errors of commission, such as ampu-
tating the wrong leg. But these cases are surely very rare. Much more common
are errors of judgment or errors of diagnosis, sometimes due to not spending
enough time with the patient, not having backup personnel, and so forth. In
such cases, there may be no explicit coverage decision by the MCO, but the
physician/providers may be responding to the financial incentives created by
capitation, risk pools for referrals, and so forth. (although most physicians,
especially specialists, are not currently subject to these incentives),5 and/or
hassles of dealing with utilization reviewers.
Does this mean that the coverage/treatment dichotomy breaks down and
the case against vicarious liability dissolves? We think not, provided that
treatment decisions are evaluated relative to a new standard of care, which
recognizes the legitimacy of standard MCO control strategies such as provider
risk sharing, in the situations in which such incentives apply, not relative to
the old indemnity standard. Of course, defining this new standard is not easy,
particularly during a time of flux. Emerging new standards of care reflect
not only new forms of insurance coverage but also new information on
effectiveness/cost-effectiveness of treatments. The evolution of these new
norms will be determined in part by legal constraints. Already, in response
to the legal and public opinion backlash, some major MCOs are reducing or
eliminating their use of direct controls and protocols, which makes coverage
decisions explicit, resorting instead to placing incentives on physicians.6 This
blurs the coverage/treatment decision. It may also be one reason why phy-
sicians are now supporting MCO liability.
' See also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care? 26 J. Legal
Stud. 491 (1997).
' Marsha Gold, Financial Incentives: Current Realities and Challenges for Physicians, 14 J.
Gen. Internal Med. S6 (1999).
6 Center for Studying Health System Change, Providing Insights That Contribute to Better
Health Policy (1999) (annual report).
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LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACTS WITH MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
In recent years, under the guise of patient protection, state legislatures
have enacted various legal rules with the ostensible purpose of helping the
public. These include anti-indemnification rules, antiretaliation rules, and
antiwaiver rules. Anti-indemnification rules prohibit an MCO from collecting
indemnity from physicians after the MCO has been found liable. The rationale
for such prohibitions is asymmetric bargaining power between MCOs and
physicians.
Here we are in total agreement with Epstein and Sykes. An indemnification
clause is only one of many elements of the contract between a plan and a
physician. To the extent that doctors dislike such clauses, they can choose
not to contract with the MCO or demand higher compensation. This assumes,
of course, that MCOs in a market do not collude in setting terms of contracts
with doctors. The appropriate remedy for exercise of market power is the
use of antitrust laws, not implementation of multiple rules, which are Band-
Aids.
For antiretaliation rules, as Epstein and Sykes note, the basic question is
adequacy of remedies for wrongful denial of coverage rather than whether
an antiretaliation rule is implemented. We might add that an MCO that gets
a reputation for retaliating against its physicians for providing professional
advice about the benefits versus costs of procedures will ultimately have to
pay its doctors more. Thus, it is likely to be in the MCO's business interest
to limit the number of retaliatory measures in which physician judgment was
clearly poor. We totally agree with Epstein and Sykes that broad statutes
limiting MCOs' ability to retaliate may unduly constrain the MCOs in dealing
with "bad apple" physicians.
We also are not very sympathetic to antiwaiver rules. An employee or
employer group may be willing to relinquish its tort rights in return for a
lower premium, and the law should not ban such transactions outright. On
the other hand, there should be a quid pro quo, not just a giveaway to an
MCO. Also, waivers signed by patients at the point of service are question-
able, especially if nothing is given in return.
CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions are a more recent mode of legal attack on MCOs but are
based on the same false premise, that cost control strategies harm patients.
This is a blatant case of "Look Mom, no empirical evidence" (but plenty of
anecdotes). The empirical evidence overall does not indicate that quality of
care is worse in MCOs than that delivered by indemnity plans.7 Similar
7 Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality
of Care? 16 Health Aff. 7 (1997).
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objections apply to the class action allegations as to the vicarious liability
tack. Epstein and Sykes make a strong legal case against class certification.
In addition, the charges are surely absurd on economic grounds. The plain-
tiffs' argument, explicit or implicit, reduces to the charge that MCO enrollees
were charged too much, presumably because they were misled into expecting
a higher quality of coverage than the plans actually delivered. This was
allegedly possible because enrollees were expecting standard norms of care,
whereas in fact MCOs use various supply-side strategies to control costs,
including utilization review by administrative personnel, as described by
Epstein and Sykes. If it is true that enrollees were led to expect systematically
more coverage than they actually received, then either the offending HMOs
would have realized supernormal profits during the period of the alleged
overcharging or rapid entry would have occurred to bid away the excess
expected profit or both. More technically, a profit margin, or the types of
other margins that are typically used to give support to the notion of excess
profitability, is an inadequate indicator of profitability. Furthermore, profit
(underwriting) cycles in the insurance industry are a well-known character-
istic of this sector.8 If profits are artificially limited at the high end of a profit
cycle, such insurers will not earn a competitive, risk-adjusted rate of return
and will exit (which might suit many observers, including physicians whose
incomes have been reduced by managed care, just fine).
QUIBBLES
Although we are in general agreement with Epstein and Sykes, we end
with some differences of opinion. First, the case for allocating liability for
coverage decisions to MCOs and liability for negligent practice to providers
rests on the assumption that it is possible to distinguish between the insurance
function, which finances care, and the provision or delivery of the care itself.
Given this, it is confusing to refer to MCOs as providers, as in "third-party
providers," or to say that MCOs "contract with employers and occasionally
with individuals to provide a bundle of health care services for a predeter-
mined fee."9 More precisely, MCOs contract to provide insurance coverage
for covered services, conditional on the enrollee getting those services from
specified providers of care and subject to certain reviews of appropriateness.
Thus, the conventional usage, which refers to MCOs and other insuring
entities as insurers or "payers," is worth retaining here, whereas "providers"
refers to hospitals, physicians, and others who deliver medical care.
This may be hairsplitting, but it may help maintain the conceptual dis-
tinction between the insurance function and the care delivery function, which
8 Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets,
5 Yale J. on Reg. 455 (1988).
9 Epstein & Sykes, supra note 1, at 627.
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is fundamental to the case for splitting liability. Similarly, Epstein and Sykes
refer to MCOs as "denying treatment to subscribers,"'" which again may
undermine the case they are trying to establish. The function of MCOs is
risk bearing, contracting for and paying for care. As part of this insurance
function, MCOs, like all other insurers, must define limits on what they will
pay for. Thus MCOs, like indemnity and government insurers, may deny
payment for treatment. But denying payment is less than denying treatment:
the patient can still obtain treatment by paying out-of-pocket or seeking
charity care or other financing sources. The denial of coverage has financial
consequences, but it does not directly lead to medical consequences.
Second, the authors state that "[i]n the malpractice area, scholarly studies
suggest that the courts are rather poor at identifying malpractice-many bona
fide cases of malpractice are overlooked, while lawsuits often focus on cases
where the physician did nothing wrong."" They cite two sources.
If this statement were more important to the paper, it would be worthy of
more discussion. However, we make the following points. The view that
there is considerable underclaiming, that is, that the number of medical errors
exceeds the number of medical malpractice claims, appears to be valid. 2
These measures of medical error were based on medical definitions, not the
concept of cost-justified care that underlies the economic definition of neg-
ligence, but this is an issue beyond the scope of this comment.
However, the second part of the statement is far more controversial. Courts
and, much more commonly, the settlement process are not perfect in meting
out compensation for wrongdoing, but the system's results are far from
random." Some of the evidence on the system's inadequacies comes from
medical chart reviews that compare the status of the suit with the "medical
truth" as determined by a couple of raters.
Two assumptions underlie this rating process. First, given available in-
formation, the raters know more than the parties to a suit. Second, the raters
have as much information at their disposal as the parties to the suit. Typically,
the raters have one medical record. By contrast, the parties have depositions,
material obtained through the discovery process, including medical records,
expert testimony, and, in those cases that go to trial, information introduced
at trial. Juries, but not medical chart raters, can see the sweat on the de-
fendant's brow. Attacks on the legal system serve many purposes, mainly
political ones, but we in the academic community should demand a higher
standard of evidence.
'0 Id. at 647.
11Id. at 642.
12 Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (2000).
"3 Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical Malpractice (1993).
